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Abstract We present a model of a bank with endogenous risk choices, where delegated moni-
toring by an active market in subordinate debt helps in containing the bank’s risk shifting in the
presence of deposit insurance. In comparison to static ex ante contracting, an active market enables
continuous monitoring by subordinate debt to penalise the bank’s risk shifting. The model is in-
strumental in deriving optimal level of subordinate debt required to achieve equilibrium where
banks choose risk levels consistent with the ﬁrst best as envisaged by a social planner. The optimal
quantity of subordinate debt further eliminates any risk shifting associated even with risk in-
sensitive premiums.
© 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Indian Institute of Management
Bangalore. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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Introduction
Banking ﬁrms are unique institutions both by the nature of
their operation and also by the nature of their constitution.
In the process of rendering efﬁcient allocation of risk among
depositors and ﬁrms, banks build up a book with small de-
posits and risky loans. These small deposits are usually held
by unsophisticated depositors without the necessary infor-
mation to efﬁciently monitor the portfolio of risky loans.
Further, the claims of these depositors are usually very small
which generates little incentive for them to gather costly in-
formation for monitoring.1 This entails that the risky portfolio
of banks remains largely opaque to the depositors. There-
fore, as uninformed or partly informed depositors are inef-
ﬁcient in framing optimal contracts with the bank, they would
mostly bear inordinate risk.
As deposits constitute the bulk of the liabilities, banks
operate with high leverage with very small capital of their
own. The high leverage makes the banks risky which when
accompanied by opacity of the bank’s portfolio to the de-
positors makes information based bank runs2 more prob-
able. In addition, high leverage and opaque bank portfolios
can distort managerial incentives and encourage banks to look
for further implicit leverage, which in turn makes the banks
even more risky. Thus opaque portfolios provide risk shift-
ing incentives to banks.
* Corresponding author. Fax: 0731-2439800.
E-mail address: gauravs@iimidr.ac.in (G.S. Chauhan).
1 This is the basis of the representation hypothesis led by Dewatripont
and Tirole (1993) in favour of an external regulator.
2 See Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) for a discussion on panics and
information based bank runs.
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Moreover, the nature of the balance sheet renders high
degree of similarity between any two banks. Even if banks
intend to differ in their asset composition, they are per-
ceived to be similar by uninformed depositors, especially in
times of distress. A run on bank A is perceived as increasing
difﬁculties for another seemingly similar bank B. Assets of bank
A are generic liabilities for bank B in a closely intercon-
nected system of banks.3 Thus, a run on bank A could pose
immediate liquidity pressure on bank B and could further trans-
late into solvency threats for bank B within no time. At the
inception of such a loss and liquidity spiral,4 bank B might oth-
erwise be healthy. On account of such contagion, bank runs
threaten the systemic stability by sucking up the liquidity from
the system.
In an effort to address the aforesaid information asym-
metry, we need agents to (i) avert information based bank
runs by uninformed depositors, and (ii) monitor bank risk to
restrain risk shifting. Explicit deposit insurance by govern-
ment backed agents is perhaps the best aid discussed in the
literature to reduce the possibility of information based bank
runs.5 Moreover, such insurance is desirable given that (i) un-
informed depositors are unable to frame optimal debt con-
tracts, and (ii) it would add the much needed implicit liquidity
in the system by insulating banks from information based bank
runs, as discussed in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).6
However, insured depositors lack the necessary incen-
tive to monitor the risk of banks on their own. This provides
banks with the risk shifting incentives to choose a level of
risk which is socially suboptimal. Thus, the principal problem
of checking the risk shifting incentives of banks still remains
unresolved. To alleviate the risk shifting incentives of banks
where depositors are insured, an important measure would
be to charge risk based insurance premiums. However, gov-
ernment backed agents are not well equipped to estimate
the risk sensitivity, and hence to estimate risk based
premiums.7
In these circumstances, greater participation from market
forces is warranted to contain the risk shifting incentives of
the banks. As per Kaufman (2003), market discipline re-
quires the existence of some de-facto at-risk stakeholders,
who have an incentive to monitor the banks. A market ori-
ented proposal to check the risk shifting incentive of a bank
is the provision of subordinate debt8 as an active monitor on
banking books. Subordinate claims of these securities gives
greater incentive for investors to monitor a bank’s risk closely.
While being active monitors, they can impart valuable signals
to the markets and regulators. What would be interesting,
however, is to explore conditions under which subordinate
debt can act as a delegated monitor to check risk shifting in-
centives of the banks effectively.
In this context, this paper presents a model of a bank
with endogenous risk choices, where delegated monitoring
by subordinate debt helps to contain risk shifting by banks
in the presence of deposit insurance. The model builds on
past studies, where subordinate debt could not dynamically
inﬂuence banks, largely by acting merely as a passive instru-
ment after entering into a contract. The model here envis-
ages an active market for subordinate debt which can
continuously impart signals to the regulators and other at-
risk stakeholders. This provides the necessary discipline for
banks so that they may conform to solvency consistent
behaviour.9
The joint feature is envisaged in the model (i) to reduce
the possibility of bank runs by explicit deposit insurance to
uninformed or partly uninformed depositors, and (ii) to check
the risk shifting incentives of a bank by subordinate debt. The
model helps us to derive optimal level of subordinate debt
required to achieve an equilibrium where banks choose risk
level consistent with the ﬁrst best as envisaged by a social
planner.10 Further, subordinate debt could be resorted to, to
price deposit insurance effectively.
The paper is organised as follows. The second section con-
tains a brief review of related literature. The third section
discusses the model. The fourth section describes risk shift-
ing incentive for a bank provided with deposit insurance and
subordinate debt, featuring them individually and simulta-
neously. The ﬁfth section deals with pricing anomalies of
deposit insurance and their rectiﬁcation by subordinate debt.
The sixth section discusses the implications, and the seventh
section concludes the paper.
Related literature
While explicit deposit insurance could completely insulate
banks from a possible run, there is no incentive for deposi-
tors to monitor the risk of the bank, which could aggravate
the risk shifting incentives11 and erode market discipline, apart
from increasing systemic risk (Penati & Protopapadakis, 1988).
Further, in such a scheme the government may have to tax
depositors heavily for the provision of insurance, in case there
is a need to provide liquidity. This may lead to possible dead-
weight costs in the system.12
3 See Allen and Gale (2000) for domino model of bank contagion due
to interrelated businesses.
4 See Diamond and Rajan (2005) and Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont
(2000) for contagious bank runs and subsequent system failure due
to failure of one bank in an economy with several banks and the ex-
istence of interbank market.
5 See Santos (2000) for a review of proposals to insulate banks from
runs.
6 See also Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) for theory of ﬁnancial in-
termediation based on liquidity provisioning by banks.
7 See Benston and Kaufman (1996) and Stiglitz (1993) for argu-
ments discussing inability of government regulators in assessing risk.
8 See Lang and Robertson (2002), Evanoff and Wall (2000), Calomiris
(1999) and Wall (1989) for various proposals on subordinate debt.
9 The model can be seen as a reinforcement of capital adequacy re-
quirement in Basel 3.
10 The social planner envisaged here is similar to a regulator or a gov-
ernment agent who intends to maximise social welfare.
11 See, for example, Ioannidou and Penas (2010), Kunt and Huizinga
(2004), and Cordella and Yeyati (2002) for empirical evidences on
signiﬁcant changes in banks risk-taking, ex post, in such deposit in-
surance programmes.
12 Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992) give a contradictory view
where they use a dynamic framework to show that future rents may
be generated by a subsidised deposit insurance scheme, which leads
banks to reduce their risk taking in order to raise the probability of
reaping these future rents.
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Risk shifting incentive remains with the banks when banks
cannot internalise the full cost of their risk taking. This occurs
when banks are charged insurance premiums other than the
ﬁrst best risk sensitive premiums. However, risk sensitive or
market based premiums are difﬁcult to be implemented by
a government insurer for several reasons. Firstly, a deposit
insurer in the form of a government backed agency lacks
resources to estimate accurately the risk sensitivity13 and
hence the dynamics of market based premium. Secondly, it
is structurally difﬁcult for such an insurer to implement dif-
ferent premiums for all the banks in the system. Finally,
market based premium would lead to proﬁt making for the
insurers, which goes against the constitution of these insur-
ers. To avoid such proﬁt making, the government insurer
usually charges actuarially fair premiums which let the insurer
break even.
Since actuarially fair insurance premiums are not the ﬁrst
best, risk shifting incentive remains with the bank. Pennacchi
(2006) shows that actuarially fair premiums subsidise the level
of capital provided by the owners. This implicit subsidisation
leads banks to take on more risk than physical capital levels
would call for. The increase in the risk is sought by invest-
ing in loan commitments and other off balance sheet activi-
ties with high degree of procyclicality.14
An effective counter mechanism to deal with the moral
hazard, under these circumstances, is to subject banks under
certain order of market discipline by at-risk stakeholders.
Further, risk assessment by market forces could enable the
deposit insurer to charge risk sensitive premiums. Unin-
sured subordinate debt15 in banking books is one such at-
risk stakeholder which can play an important role in banking
capital structure by acting as an instrument for market dis-
cipline to supplement bank regulators, as discussed in Diamond
and Dybvig (1986) andWall (1989). Being subordinate in claims,
these investors could anticipate an early loss to their stakes
just after the losses have been borne by small capital in
banking books, whenever the banks fail. This gives greater
incentive for subordinate debt holders to monitor the bank’s
risk closely. Investment in such uninsured securities further
ensures that the investors are true risk bearers unlike de-
positors who may choose banks mostly for liquidity needs
rather than for bearing risks.
At the root of risk monitoring by debt holders is the nature
of the contract they could frame with the banks. Unsophis-
ticated depositors would be unable to frame optimal con-
tracts owing to their inadequate knowledge and resources to
monitor the bank. Also, these contracts may not be optimal
even in case of risk being monitored by informed subordinate
debt holders.16 This is primarily because these contracts are
largely passive when subordinate debt disciplines the banks
ex ante or through interest rates which are decided before
the investments are made. In such contracts, subordinate debt
holders would anticipate the risk of a bank and enter into a
contract considering possible risk shifting in transition.
The setting of rates in the contract, ex ante, would not
prevent banks from shifting their risks. Blum (2002) shows that
higher interest rates required by subordinate debt holders,
in anticipation of risk shifting incentive of banks, further
induce banks to take on an even higher level of risk. In such
cases, subordinate debt helps in checking risk shifting
behaviour of banks only if banks can commit to a particular
risk level. However, it is difﬁcult to realise such bank com-
mitment in case of passive ex ante contracting by subordi-
nate debt.
Further the beneﬁt of risk monitoring by market forces
cannot be realised if these agents cannot differentiate them-
selves from the regulator in terms of their monitoring tech-
nology. Sealey (2008), by assuming a monitoring technology
that is the same for any bank stakeholder, shows that the
quanta of claims for these agents differ and also their incen-
tives to choose optimal monitoring efforts which depend on
the size of such claims. The monitoring efforts by each agent
would depend upon the monitoring exercised by the other
agents. Further, due to varying and co-dependent incen-
tives of different claimholders (such as deposit insurer, regu-
lator, equity holders and subordinate debt claims) they expend
lesser efforts in monitoring the banks than what a social
planner would desire. This is due to debt-like, ﬁxed claims
of agents such as subordinate debt and private co-insurers,
which have different optimal monitoring strategies than a
social planner.
In the circumstances described above, this paper pres-
ents a model where enhanced market discipline by subordi-
nate debt is envisaged. For this a competitive trading market
in subordinate debt securities is assumed.17 Such amarket gives
expression to the risk assessment by subordinate debt, by pro-
viding continuous signals that can be used to regulate the
banks efﬁciently. Banks are progressively penalised for shifting
13 Stiglitz (1993) shows that deposit insurers ﬁnd themselves infe-
rior to market forces in assessing and monitoring risks of the banks.
Bazelon and Smetters (1999) show that the US government fails to
incorporate systematic risk premium in its evaluations.
14 See Jokipii and Milne (2008) and Pederzoli and Torricelli (2005)
for procyclicality in banking business and capital regulation.
15 See Board of Governors staff papers (1999) for a review of litera-
ture on subordinate debt. The Gramm–Leach–Billey Act (2000) was
enacted in the US where among other proposals, market discipline
is envisaged through the provision of mandatory subordinate debt for
banks.
16 The empirical evidences for risk monitoring by subordinate debt
are mixed. Gorton and Santomero (1990) and Avery, Belton, and
Goldberg (1988) question the effectiveness of such a scheme. Krishnan,
Ritchken, and Thomson (2005) show that although subordinate debt
credit spreads responds to the level of the risk, there are weak evi-
dences of the change in credit spreads responding to the change in
the risk. In contrast, Menz (2010), Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux
(2002), Morgan and Stiroh (2001), Evanoff and Wall (2000), and
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) ﬁnd positive relationship between credit
spreads and accounting and enhanced accounting risk measures, in-
dicating the effectiveness of subordinate debt in checking the risk
shifting incentives for the banks.
17 Evanoff, Jagtiani, and Nakata (2011) show an enhanced risk-
spread relationship in a market with greater depth and transpar-
ency. They found empirical evidences consistent with the idea that
periods surrounding new debt issues result in improved risk pricing
by subordinate debt. Further, they postulate that a market with a
fully implemented subordinate debt programme would most likely
be deeper and more transparent and hence would increase market
discipline.
G.S. Chauhan, S.S. Sundaram138
their risk by the use of continuous information from the sub-
ordinate debt market. Importantly, in such a case, banks need
not pre-commit to a level of risk.18 Moreover, banks have en-
dogenous incentives to choose the risk so as to conform to
the solvency consistent behaviour owing to adverse signal-
ling by subordinate debt claims.
Another distinction in the paper, which underscores active
monitoring by subordinate debt, is the role of superior moni-
toring technology assumed in the model here. Since subor-
dinate debt claims have stronger incentives to monitor the
risk of a bank, they are likely to monitor a bank’s risk much
more effectively than any other agent. Further, the exis-
tence of a competitive market enables subordinate debt
holders to make greater use of this monitoring technology in
achieving better returns for their investments independent
of the monitoring by other agents and also independent of
the size of subordinate debt claims. Competitive markets also
complement the superior monitoring technology of inves-
tors, as investors could be good at evaluating banks but may
be poor in inﬂuencing them (Flannery, 2001). Thus, such moni-
toring can impart valuable signals to other inferior agents.19
An important utility of information revealed by subordi-
nate debt is to enable the deposit insurers to charge market
based premiums with relative ease of assessing risk. Also,
active monitoring by subordinate debt holders can check risk
shifting incentives even in the case of actuarially fair pre-
miums. Speciﬁcally, the model in the latter part of this paper
shows that the optimal allocation of subordinate debt would
eliminate any risk shifting incentive associated even with ac-
tuarially fair premiums.
The model
This paper proposes a model for a bank with endogenous risk
choices for an economy with single period and two dates t = 0,
1. A bank has liabilities in the form of insured deposits and
uninsured subordinate debt. Through this joint structure of
liabilities, we seek to ﬁnd the conditions under which banks
choose their risk levels consistent with the ﬁrst best as desired
by a social planner. Subsequently, we seek the active moni-
toring role of subordinate debt so as to reduce the implicit
subsidisation that stems from actuarially fair deposit insur-
ance premiums.
In a risk-neutral setting, let the bank be funded by insured
deposits D, uninsured subordinate debt S, and equity E. De-
posits are insured with an insurer whose default probability
is zero. Also, there are no premiums for the deposit insur-
ance provided by these insurers. The bank invests these funds
in a risky portfolio P at t = 0; the gross returns for the risky
portfolio at t = 1 are dependent on one of the three pos-
sible states. In each of these states the returns are denoted
as:
r
r p state
r state
r state
P =
( )⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
1
2
3
2
3
(1)
While the gross returns in state 1 is a function of p, the
gross returns in states 2 and 3 assume a ﬁxed value depend-
ing upon the nature of initial investment. The total initial asset
for investment in the risky portfolio is (D + S + E). These returns
describe the gross payoffs such that:
r p D S E r D r S
r D r D S E r D r S
r D S E
f s
f f s
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The portfolio does not default in state 1. If p is the prob-
ability that the portfolio does not default, the probability for
state 1 is p and for states 2 and 3 jointly is (1-p). Further,
given that the portfolio defaults, the probability for occur-
rence of state 2 is denoted by θ, while the occurrence of state
3 then is denoted by (1-θ). The returns for the risky portfo-
lio in state 1 is such that r(p) is decreasing function of prob-
ability p i.e. r′(p) < 0 and p.r(p) is a strict concave function
of the probability p. This is to ensure that an optimal level
of default probability exists for banks to choose risk endog-
enously. Also, Eq. (2) above would mean bankruptcy for a bank
in states 2 and 3. In these states, the gross recovery of risky
portfolio is weighted average of gross returns over these states
and is denoted by d, which is assumed constant such that:
θ θ. .r r d2 31+ −( ){ } = (3)
Further, the distribution of deposits and subordinate debt
is such that a fraction (α) of the total liabilities (D + S) is sub-
ordinate debt, while (1-α) is insured deposits. Since depos-
its are completely insured, they would earn a riskless gross
rate of return rf, while the uninsured subordinate debt would
earn a gross rate of rs > rf.
The investors in subordinate debt securities are assumed
to have adequate knowledge, ability and willingness to monitor
the bank risk. Further the manifestation of such monitoring
is visible through a competitive trading market for subordi-
nate debt of banks. The levels and sensitivity of credit spreads
would indicate the riskiness of a bank. The monitoring tech-
nology with subordinate debt, due to its knowledge, ability
and willingness, is assumed to be superior to any other eco-
nomic agent except the bank owners.20 The subordinate debt
holders impart useful signals to the market with certain noise
denoted by εi, which is assumed to be normally distributed
across the range of the signals. The absolute level of noise
is such that:
εi f sr r< < (4)
The assumption of the noise takes care of the fact that
while subordinate debt holders can reveal the risk of the bank,
18 Niu (2008) showed that existing safe assets in a bank’s portfolio
act as a commitment for containing risk in future. Similar to Blum
(2002), risk shifting by banks could not be checked in the absence
of such commitment.
19 An interesting feature of the model in Chen and Hasan (2011) is
that regulatory action is triggered by the bank’s failure to issue sub-
ordinate debt rather than by market spreads. This is on account of
acknowledging the fact that signals may be too noisy to serve as a
means for corrective actions by regulators.
20 Since monitoring is costly, a superior monitoring technology would
ensure lowmarginal cost of information production. This would ensure
that inferior agents do not need to duplicate the efforts which may
increase the spreads sought after by these agents in the market.
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they still do not have the perfect knowledge possessed by bank
owners. The distribution assumption of the noise ensures that
although subordinate debt holders may be inferior to bank
owners in possessing knowledge of the risky portfolio, bank
owners cannot assume a systematic advantage to exploit this
noise in their favour all the time. Since the monitoring by sub-
ordinate debt is superior to that of any other agent, no moni-
toring is assumed to be performed by these other agents. This
is due to the fact that monitoring is costly and information
is willingly provided by the market for subordinate debt
without any cost being incurred by any other agent. The cost
for monitoring by subordinate debt is such that it is a de-
creasing function of the probability p denoted by c(p) such
that c′(p) < 0. This means that the better the quality of assets,
the lesser the cost of monitoring incurred and vice versa. Thus,
subordinate debt holders can observe the probability p with
some noise by incurring the cost of monitoring, c(p).
Risk shifting incentives for the bank
To analyse and compare the risk shifting incentives for the
bank, we ﬁrst seek the objective function of a social planner.
This objective function gives us the benchmark case against
which wemay be able to look at the incentives of a bank under
varying provisions of deposit insurance and subordinate debt.
The social planner is one who maximises the social welfare
by maximising the expected surplus in the economy while
choosing the optimal level of risk for the bank. The objec-
tive function can, therefore, be described as:
Max p r p D S E
p r r D S E r D Sf
. .
. . . . .
( ) + +( ){ }[
+ −( ) + −( ){ } + +( ) − +(1 12 3θ θ )] (5)
The ﬁrst order condition for Eq. (5) above is:
D S E
p r p
p
r r D S E+ +( ) ∂ ( )( )∂ − + −( ){ } + +( ) =.
.
. . .θ θ2 31 0 (6)
Using Eq. (3) above, Eq. (6) can be rephrased as:
D S E
p r p
p
d D S E+ +( ) ∂ ( )( )∂ − + +( ) =.
.
. 0 (7)
Risk shifting with deposit insurance
Next we determine the objective function of the bank in case
of deposit insurance only. This can be described as choosing
the optimal level of risk so as to maximise the expected surplus
of the bank. Since deposits are completely insured, the return
earned on these is the riskless rate rf. Also, as described in
the model above, we have assumed the insurance premium
to be zero. The bank thus maximises:
Max p r p D E r Df. . .( ) +( ) −{ }[ ] (8)
It can be noticed in Eq. (8) that the bank receives nothing
in case of default by the portfolio. The ﬁrst order condition
for Eq. (8) above can be described as:
D E
p r p
p
r Df+( ) ∂ ( )( )∂ − =.
.
. 0 (9)
Comparison of the ﬁrst order conditions would deter-
mine the choice of p by the bank vis-à-vis the social planner.
In other words, this points towards the risk shifting incen-
tive of the bank. Let the risk level chosen by a social planner
be represented by probability of no default for the risky port-
folio as pSP and the respective risk level for the bank pro-
vided with deposit insurance by pB1. Comparing Eq. (9) and
Eq. (7) and from Eq. (2) above, after setting S = 0, it can be
seen that since,
r D d D Ef. . , ,> +( ) we have
p pB SP1 < (10)
Interpreting Eq. (10) would mean that risk shifting incen-
tives exist for the banks in case of deposit insurance alone.
Since the recovered value of the risky portfolio is not sufﬁ-
cient to pay off all the insured depositors, the bank beneﬁts
from the bankruptcy to the extent that gross payoffs to the
depositors exceed the recovered value of the portfolio. Banks
could anticipate the beneﬁt and would choose lower p by
taking on riskier investments. This leads to the following
results.
Result 1. In case of deposit insurance only, banks have risk
shifting incentives leading them to choose riskier invest-
ments than that which is desirable by a social planner. Their
choice of riskier investments is represented by pB1 < pSP.
Risk shifting with deposit insurance and subordinate debt
We now take up the provision of subordinate debt for a bank
in two situations. We ﬁrst discuss the case of typical ex ante
contracting by subordinate debt. In this case, the bank would
not incorporate the risk assessment by subordinate debt con-
tinuously. Subsequently, we envisage a competitive market
for subordinate debt which enables the banks to incorpo-
rate such risk assessment continuously.
Ex ante contracting by subordinate debt
In this situation at t = 0, subordinate debt holders contract
the rate of return, and the bank needs to make periodic pay-
ments to these claims as and when they are due, before going
bankrupt. Owing to such contractual arrangement, risk moni-
toring is effective only in extreme situations where terms of
the covenants are violated. Thus, there are no active or usable
signals by subordinate debt in other situations. Further, there
is no continuous mechanism to penalise the bank in antici-
pation of adverse signalling by subordinate debt. In a way,
continuous signals of risk monitoring may not be available in
the absence of a mechanism such as a competitive trading
market in subordinate debt.
In this situation, the bank chooses the level of risk so as
to maximise the expected surplus:
Max p r p D S E r D r Sf s. . . .( ) + +( ) − −{ }[ ] (11)
The absence of risk monitoring in transition by subordi-
nate debt is evident from ex ante contracting of the re-
quired rate of return rs. The ﬁrst order condition for Eq. (11)
can be described as:
D S E
p r p
p
r D r Sf s+ +( ) ∂ ( )( )∂ − +( ) =.
.
. . 0 (12)
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In this case, let pB2 be the probability of no default for risky
portfolio which represents the choice of the bank for the level
of risk. Since comparing Eqs. (12) and (7), and from Eq. (2)
above results in:
r D r S d D S Ef s. . . , ,+( ) > + +( ) we have
p pB SP2 < (13)
Thus, risk shifting incentive remains in the case where sub-
ordinate debt monitors the bank through an ex ante con-
tract with the help of typical debt covenants. Further,
inequality (Eq. (13)) would also mean that there can be greater
incentive for banks to shift the risk in this case as compared
to the previous case of deposit insurance only. This can be
seen from the fact that as the required rate of return by sub-
ordinate debt holders increases, the difference between gross
payoffs to the liabilities and the recovered value of the risky
portfolio increases. The larger this difference, the greater is
the risk shifting incentive for the bank. Importantly, ex ante
contracting of interest rates payable to subordinate debt gives
incentive for banks to choose riskier investments. Further,
in anticipation of such risk shifting incentive, subordinate debt
can only choose to charge higher interest rates, which gives
even greater incentives to shift to much riskier invest-
ments. This is the case similar to Blum (2002) with no com-
mitment by the banks to contain risk at certain levels. The
discussion is formalised in the result below.
Result 2. In case of ex ante rate contracts by subordi-
nate debt where banks do not incorporate the risk assess-
ment on a continuous basis, risk shifting incentives for banks
persist i.e. banks choose pB2 < pSP. Further, these incentives
are aggravated when subordinate debt holders require higher
rates in anticipation of risk shifting in transition.
Continuous incorporation of subordinate debt signals by the
bank
Acknowledging the pitfalls in monitoring by subordinate debt
holders in ex ante contracts, it becomes vital to continu-
ously extract the information in credit spread signals of sub-
ordinate debt so as to penalise the bank in case of adverse
signalling. Markets in these securities can provide this infor-
mation on a continuous basis. The importance of subordi-
nate debt market can be seen from this proposition.
Subordinate debt, therefore, is featured now where banks
can be continuously penalised to shift the risk. The signals
from subordinate debt can inﬂuence the risk taking behaviour
of banks by asking banks to directly or indirectly pay for risk
shifting. For example, banks can be asked by regulators to
(i) pay risk based deposit insurance premiums, (ii) keep risk
sensitive capital, (iii) adjust the deposit base in tune with the
risk, (iv) adjust the size of the balance sheet, or (v) keep re-
serves to accommodate the par value of subordinate debt,
or a combination of these measures. These are some of the
mechanisms which can use subordinate debt signal to inﬂu-
ence banks’ risk shifting.
While the ﬁrst mechanism is explored in detail in the next
section, any of the last four mechanisms may lead the bank
to pay for its risk shifting. To model this phenomenon, the
required rate of return by subordinate debt holders is set such
that it is a function of the probability of default for the risky
portfolio. Further, the subordinate debt market reveals the
risk of the risky portfolio with some noise. Also, the moni-
toring by subordinate debt holders incurs a cost.
Let rs(p) be the required rate of returns by subordinate debt
claims at any time t, rf be the risk-free rate, c(p) be the cost
of monitoring such that c′(p) < 0. Also, let the risk be re-
vealed in the market with noise εi. When banks are forced
to incorporate the yield spreads in their objective function,
they would choose the level of risk so as to maximise the ex-
pected surplus. The objective function, then, can be de-
scribed as:
Max p r p D S E r D r p Sf s. . . .( ) + +( ) − − ( ){ }[ ] (14)
where, r p
r c p
ps
f
i( ) = + ( ) + ε (15)
The expression (Eq. (15)) is an estimate of the required
returns for a risk-neutral agent who is compensated with risk-
free rate and the cost of monitoring of a risky portfolio. The
ﬁrst order condition for Eq. (14) above can be described as:
D S E
p r p
p
r D c p Sf i+ +( ) ∂ ( )( )∂ − + ′ ( ) +( ){ } =.
.
. .ε 0 (16)
Comparing Eq. (16) with Eq. (12) and owing to the fact that
c′(p) < 0 and εi f sr r< < we ﬁnd that:
r D c p S r D r Sf i f s. . . .+ ′ ( ) +( ){ } < +( )ε (17)
Also, setting
S D S and D D S= + = − +( ) ( ) ( )α α. . ,1 (18)
Eq. (16) can be rearranged as:
D S E
p r p
p
r D S c p D Sf i
+ +( ) ∂ ( )( )∂
− −( ) +( ) + ′ ( ) +( ) +( ){ } =
.
.
. . . .1 0α ε α (19)
On comparing Eq. (19) with Eq. (7), the ﬁrst best can be
achieved if:
r c p D S d D S Ef i. . . .1−( ) + ′ ( ) +( ){ } +( ) = + +( )α ε α (20)
The expression above can be simpliﬁed to get a closed form
solution for α in Eq. (19), if we set E = 0 and take the limit-
ing worst case scenario where c′(p) = 0. The fraction of sub-
ordinate debt required to achieve the ﬁrst best, α, therefore
is given by:
α
ε
=
−
−
r d
r
f
f i
(21)
Or, when εi = 0,
α = −1
d
rf
(22)
Let us assume that the bank maximises the surplus by
solving Eq. (14) and chooses the level of risk represented by
probability of no default for risky portfolio pB3. For the level
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of subordinate debt given by Eq. (21) we have pB3 = pSP. In other
words the bank chooses the risk consistent with the ﬁrst best.
Thus, in the case where banks regularly incorporate the
risk assessment by subordinate debt in their objective func-
tion, the risk shifting can be completely eliminated when
optimal level of subordinate debt is chosen. Importantly the
result shows that α, the optimal quantity of subordinate debt,
is decreasing with the recovery rate d, and increasing with
the noise level εi. Both of these features give additional in-
centives to deter banks from increasing their risk. This can
be seen as follows. By choosing better quality of assets with
higher recovery rates, banks can operate with smaller quan-
tity of costly subordinate debt. Further, as cost of monitor-
ing reduces with diminishing default probabilities of higher
quality assets, banks need to pay lower risk premium for sub-
ordinate debt. Also, εi, the noise in subordinate debt yield,21
is a measure of volatility; it can be reduced by choosing less
risky assets. Further, in an attempt to reduce the noise in yield
spreads, banks would make efforts voluntarily for greater dis-
closure to the subordinate claim holders, which can further
reduce the cost of monitoring and hence the required yield.
This leads to the following result.
Result 3. In case of continuous incorporation of subordi-
nate debt signals, the bank chooses the level of risk consis-
tent with the social planner, i.e. p pB SP3 = , provided that level
of subordinate debt is given by:
α
ε
=
−
−
r d
r
f
f i
Deposit insurance premiums and subordinate debt
This section discusses the role of subordinate debt in pricing
deposit insurance premiums. In this context it is of immedi-
ate interest to reﬂect over the optimal deposit insurance
premium for an insurer in cases where risk is actively moni-
tored by subordinate debt. This is important as cost of moni-
toring is a signiﬁcant component of the economic composition
of insurance premiums. Essentially, insurers charge insur-
ance premiums for the explicit guarantee they render to the
depositors in case of default by a bank. Thus, insurers would
require such premiums (i) to cover the cost of monitoring,
and (ii) to bear the expected losses in case of default by a
bank. Following this, the best possible deposit insurance would
have minimum expected losses along with low cost of moni-
toring to the insurers and yet the explicit safety of deposits
is ensured. In such a case, apart from knowing the quantum
of the insurance premium, we would like to know the fea-
tures of the agents who can effectively provide such insur-
ance. We discuss these issues in detail below.
We take up the deposit insurance pricing on a market (risk
sensitive) basis as well as on an actuarially fair22 basis.
Pennacchi (2006) discusses the moral hazard associated with
actuarially fair premiums. The model here builds on this with
subtle differences with regard to the introduction of subor-
dinate debt as an instrument which can alleviate the moral
hazard associated with deposit insurance. We show that the
subordinate debt helps to counter the risk shifting incen-
tive on several fronts. First, it reduces the implicit capital
subsidy and eliminates it completely when subordinate debt
is set at its optimal quantity. Second, market-based premi-
ums can be set with relative ease by government insurers,
owing to the fact that risk is observable through subordi-
nate debt signals. Third, subordinate debt may help to account
for systematic risk23 which is a principal cause of procyclicality.
The mandate to incorporate subordinate debt signals by the
banks in their objective functions could even incentivise banks
to invest in a counter-cyclical manner. These features of sub-
ordinate debt are explored below in detail.
Let the actual probability of no default for the risky port-
folio be denoted by pa along with the risk-neutral probabil-
ity of no default p. Also, for simplicity, we assume the cost
of monitoring c(p) to be zero. We shall now seek to derive
the market based premium for deposit insurance.
Following the design in Pennacchi (2006), ﬁrst we take up
the case of the bank where the deposits, D, are not insured.
We assume that due to strict junior claims of subordinate debt,
their payoffs are zero in case of default of the portfolio. The
payoffs in this case for depositors and subordinate debt are
given as:
Depositors:
p X D p d D S E r Df. . . . .+ −( ) + +( ) =1 (23)
Subordinate debt:
p r S r Ss f. . .= (24)
where X is the (gross) rate of return required by depositors
and the remaining terms have their standard meanings,
deﬁned earlier. If we now assume that deposits are insured,
the market oriented deposit insurer would charge a premium,
per unit deposit as:
P X rM f= − (25)
Solving for X and PM, from Eqs. (23) and (25), we get
P
p
p D
r D d D S EM f=
−( )
− + +( ){ }1
.
. . . (26)
Actuarially fair premiums, on the other hand, are calcu-
lated such that the deposit insurer attains the break-even on
an average. The insurer in this case would rather work with
actual probability of default (or no default) in place of risk-
neutral probability of default. The premium can be found by
solving for the break-even condition for the insurer as:
p P D p r D d D S Ea A a f. . . . .− −( ) − + +( ){ } =1 0 (27)
which gives,
21 A market in subordinate debt can help in the estimation of the vola-
tility or the noise in yield spreads; thus regulators can set the re-
quired fraction of subordinate debt for each bank individually.
22 Actuarially fair premiums would let the insurer break even on an
average rather than on a risk adjusted basis.
23 Higher systematic risk is involved in bank businesses, such as loan
commitment and buying and selling of credit protection.
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P
p
p D
r D d D S EA
a
a
f=
−( )
− + +( ){ }1
.
. . . (28)
Interpreting Eqs. (27) and (28) would mean that PM = PA,
if p = pa. Further following Eq. (23) would mean that the ex-
pected return on risky portfolio of the bank is the risk-free
rate. Empirical evidence24 however suggests that these ex-
pected returns exceed the risk-free rate indicating pa > p.
Thus, PA < PM, which means banks are charged a lower premium
than what a risk sensitive approach would have charged.
To explicitly deduce the impact of this pricing anomaly,
Pennacchi (2006) has estimated the initial market value of
the bank equity EB for the bank with no subordinate debt. For
the bank with subordinate debt, the payoffs to the bank
owners in the model here are as follows:
r p D S E P r D r S with probability p
with probabili
i f s( ) + +( ) − +( ) −. . . ,
0 ty p, 1−( )(29)
where i = {M, A}. This call-option like payoff is valued using
Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979), to give initial market value
of the bank equity EB as:
E
p
r
r p D S E P r D r SB
f
i f s= ( ) + +( ) − +( ) −{ }. . . . (30)
Putting values for Pi, i = {M, A} from Eqs. (26) and (28) in
Eq. (30) yields:
E E i MB = =, for (31)
And for, ,
. .
E E
r D d D S E
r
p
p
i AB
f
f a
= +
− + +( )
−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ =1 (32)
It can be seen that the initial value of owner’s capital, EB
exceeds the actual capital employed E, in case of i = A, or
when premiums are charged on an actuarially fair basis. The
excess component is the implicit subsidisation of the capital
by actuarially fair premiums. To appreciate the utility of sub-
ordinate debt in alleviating the pricing anomaly in the case
for actuarially fair premiums, it can be seen from Eq. (32)
above that subordinate debt, explicitly and simply, has
reduced the subsidisation by acting as a buffer to absorb some
of the expected losses to the deposit insurer. However, sub-
ordinate debt as an active monitor of bank risk does much
more than this. In cases where banks are forced to incorpo-
rate subordinate debt yield spreads in their objective func-
tion, ﬁrst best level of risk can be chosen by banks.
Setting ′ ( ) =c p 0and εi = 0 in (20), we have,
r D S d D S Ef. . .1−( ) +( ) = + +( )α (33)
or,
r D d D S Ef. .= + +( ) (34)
As, we know that,
1−( ) +( ) =α . D S D
Substituting the ﬁrst best condition (Eq. (34)) in Eq. (32)
yields:
E E i AB = =, for
While we could achieve the ﬁrst best by Eq. (20) and Eq.
(34) above this would mean setting of gross recovery of risky
portfolio equal to the gross payoffs to the insured deposi-
tors. This, as we have seen above, is feasible in cases where
subordinate debt acts as a cushion to absorb some of the losses
in case of default of the risky portfolio. Importantly, the con-
dition when gross recovery is equal to the gross payoffs to the
insured depositors, may not mean that we can part with
deposit insurance in such a case. This is so because of at least
two reasons. First, depositors need to be paid risk-free rate
for the ﬁrst best condition to be achieved. Second, there is
an explicit guarantee attached with the form of deposit in-
surance provided by a government backed agency. This ex-
plicit guarantee adds an implicit liquidity in the system by
averting information based bank runs on behalf of unin-
sured depositors.
For the optimal provisioning of subordinate debt, the results
above reveal that the expected losses to the deposit insurer
are zero. Further, no monitoring costs are incurred when in-
surers rely solely on subordinate debt market signals for setting
the premiums. This implies that the deposit insurance premium
in this case has to be zero.&#x25 This is, in fact, consistent
with the model above where, Pi = PM = PA = 0. In such a case
where insured depositors are de facto protected, insurers
cannot expect to earn a positive proﬁt. The results are all the
more important given that on an actuarially fair basis, gov-
ernment deposit insurers are constrained not to earn a posi-
tive proﬁt by the constitutional and other political mandates,
and yet be effective in checking bank’s risk shifting as well
as averting information based bank runs by depositors. In these
circumstances, the ﬁrst best provisioning of subordinate debt
is the only condition which can optimise the objectives for
the best possible insurer.
As far as insurance providers are concerned, no private
insurer would provide such insurance where the expected
proﬁts are zero. Further, the quality of deposit insurance
needed for best execution cannot be provided by any private
entity, as the default probability for any private agent, other
than the government, is greater than zero. This makes private
insurers inferior to the government insurers in providing ex-
plicit guarantee. Also, this makes it difﬁcult to set risk-free
rates for insured depositors in case of private insurers. Any
other gross rate of return greater than the risk-free rate will
disturb the equilibrium for the ﬁrst best condition and will
make the optimal level of subordinate debt to be higher than
what is achieved with risk-free rates. This would adversely
24 See Pennacchi (1999) for an empirical analysis which shows that
bank assets in the US, on an average, earned about 0.985% premium
over the Treasury securities, in a span of more than 70 years ranging
from 1926 to 1996.
25 In the deposit insurance reforms suggested in Stiglitz (1993), an
attempt to increase capital levels to very high levels would reduce
the deposit insurance premiums closer to zero.
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impact the proﬁtability of banks. Following this we may infer
that only the government can provide the best explicit guar-
antee for deposit insurance. Hence, in summary, the optimal
deposit insurance premium for a social planner is zero, which
can be achieved in case of effective monitoring by subordi-
nate debt.
Further the utility of active monitoring by subordinate debt
can be appreciated when it can account for systematic risk
shifting. Upon observation of Eq. (32), as also described in
Pennacchi (2006), the banks while paying for actuarially fair
premiums assume an implicit subsidy on account of the fact
that they may choose assets having a low risk-neutral prob-
ability (p) relative to the actual probability (pa) of no default.
Banks may accomplish this by choosing asset composition with
a fairly high degree of systematic risk. Subordinate debt can
check such risk shifting owing to the fact that it makes risk-
neutral probability, p, observable. To follow this, the payoffs
for subordinate debt in a risk-neutral setting in Eq. (24) above
can be reiterated as:
p
r
r
f
s
= (35)
This implies that by observing the yield spreads, risk-
neutral probability p is observable in Eq. (35). Also, in order
to keep the spreads within bounds, banks may lose the ﬂex-
ibility to change p relative to pa. Further, banks may even
have the incentives to choose for counter-cyclical asset com-
position. This is because, if the risky portfolio consists largely
of assets with high systematic risk, this would entail undue
variation26 in p. This undue variation appears as increased vola-
tility in yield spreads for subordinate debt which further
appears as noise, εi, in Eq. (21), to determine the optimal sub-
ordinate debt. Any increase in noise, in turn, is detrimental
for the proﬁtability of banks as this would increase the allo-
cation towards costly subordinate debt. A prudent bank would
like to reduce the noise to the farthest extent possible as dis-
cussed earlier. This ex ante anticipation of increased noise
would provide counter incentives to reduce systematic risk
in the bank’s portfolio. Thus, indirectly, the active market
in subordinate debt may also account for increased system-
atic risk. This would foster market based counter-cyclical in-
stincts in bank behaviour in choosing their quantum and quality
of risk.
Discussion and implications
Themodel developed in this paper rests on the notion of truth-
ful revelation of the risk of a bank by subordinate debt holder
as an at-risk stakeholder. However, there are certain fea-
tures subordinate debt must possess to qualify for such precise
assessment of risk. First, subordinate debt holders must si-
multaneously possess knowledge, ability, and willingness to
reveal the risk of a bank. This qualiﬁcation indicates a keener
at-risk stakeholder. Second, such a revelation must be
continuous and observable by other stakeholders such as regu-
lators, deposit insurers and retail investors, who rely on these
signals. This indicates the need for a market to enable the
incorporation of the risk assessment. Further such a market
would ensure greater dissemination of the assessed informa-
tion. Such a continuous market would also provide greater
incentives for passive monitors to participate actively in the
monitoring process. Third, the noise in these signals must be
sufﬁciently small. This feature ensures the reliability of these
signals from a competitive market. Importantly, a competi-
tive market ensures willing participation by knowledgeable
investors and also helps in making the information reliable
enough to be used further.
Existence of a competitive market strengthens the con-
tract between subordinate debt and the banks, and is pref-
erable to relying on typical ex ante contracting. The strength
of subordinate debt as monitor of bank risk, in such ex ante
contracts, is the provision of covenants. However, some cov-
enants, especially in case of subordinate debt, are inappro-
priate instruments for several reasons. Blum (2002) describes
the ﬂaws in such covenants which hinder monitoring by sub-
ordinate debt. Generally, the conditions for variation in the
underlying variables, such as bank risk, are not veriﬁable. Spe-
ciﬁcally, covenants, such as containment of leverage, may
not be imposed effectively for banks. Other covenants such
as option feature may not induce monitoring once the thresh-
old is reached. Also, the monitoring is focused around the
threshold itself. This prevents continuous monitoring and also
monitoring at the extremes when it is needed the most. Fea-
tures such as acceleration of principal prior to maturity would
again weaken the incentives for monitors in times of distress.
The model, in this paper, rules out any possibility of direct
coordination between banks and subordinate debt claims.27
Unlike in ex ante contracts, banks cannot directly deter-
mine the spreads for these securities. This is important
because maximum permissible yield in some subordinate debt
proposals is restricted by direct coordination between banks
and debt holders. Such direct coordination reduces the in-
centive to monitor by making it range bound. This reduces
the value of superior monitoring capabilities of active moni-
tors. This is important, speciﬁcally, given that acquiring in-
formation is costly for monitors.
By assuming a superior monitoring technology and exis-
tence of competitive market in subordinate debt, the model
ensures best possible monitoring efforts by subordinate debt
holders which are not dependent upon monitoring by infe-
rior agents. Moreover, regulation by an external agent is
deemed secondary as external regulation ﬂows frommarket
signals and not otherwise. Regulators would rely on signals
from the market in subordinate debt to penalise banks for
shifting their risk. This is important given that when moni-
tors attain information from external regulators, they would
lose the incentive to monitor heavily regulated banks. A com-
petitivemarket induces greater incentives for subordinate debt
holders to acquire information to monitor, irrespective of the
quantum of their claims. The nature of claims of subordinate
26 This is because banks cannot possibly control the impact of sys-
tematic risk, if the allocation is biased towards systematic risk.
However, if non-systematic risk dominates, banks can have greater
control over it.
27 Chen and Hasan (2011) show that subordinate debt can be an ef-
fective mechanism for market discipline provided (among other
aspects) that regulators prohibit direct coordination between inves-
tors in subordinate debt and banks.
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debt has an inbuilt option-like feature which expresses the
assessment of risk for a bank on a continuous basis due to the
existence of a competitive market. This in turn enables in-
vestors to achieve higher returns for their investments. Thus,
active monitoring by subordinate debt has higher relevance
for inferior monitors such as deposit insurers and regulators.
An important implication of superior monitoring technol-
ogy is that the optimal quantity of subordinate debt is inde-
pendent of the monitoring efforts of any other agent, such
as the regulator. The optimal quantity rather depends upon
the quality of assets and the volatility of spreads in themarket.
These features provide endogenous incentives for banks to
choose a better risk proﬁle for their portfolios. This is because
a better quality of assets requires lesser amount of costly sub-
ordinate debt to be kept by the banks. The endogenous in-
centive for limiting the quantity of subordinate debt is a
valuable proposition, provided we consider that the only sig-
niﬁcant role subordinate debt would play is to reveal risk. This
is largely the role of a catalyst whose quantity must not disturb
the well-being of banks. An inordinate quantity of subordi-
nate debt works against the proﬁtability of banks and could
be a potential threat to their survival.
Apart from active monitoring by subordinate debt, the
model above lays emphasis on adequate incorporation of sub-
ordinate debt signals by the banks in their objective func-
tions. This can be enabled through several market oriented
regulatory interventions to inﬂuence the bank’s risk taking.
Further, reliable signals from subordinate debt spreads may
enable a regulator to enforce these contracts with minimum
effort.
As discussed earlier, on the one hand, a bank with subor-
dinate debt and uninsured deposits would be vulnerable in
terms of runs. The noisy signals from subordinate debt would
entail undue volatility in depositors’ behaviour. This may even
aggravate the tendency towards information based bank runs.
On the other hand, a bank with deposit insurance and no sub-
ordinate debt would have the associated problems of moral
hazard. Therefore, the joint structure of subordinate debt
and deposit insurance, as proposed here, acts as a
complement.
We have also presented a case for government backed
agents as the best possible insurers in a system of banks. For
such an insurer, apart from ensuring the best possible ex-
plicit guarantee,28 the insurance premium can be set to zero.
The provision of subordinate debt makes it feasible to quan-
tify the risk-neutral probability of defaults of risky portfo-
lios, with some noise. The proposed market in subordinate
debt further makes such quantiﬁcation veriﬁable. While on
the one hand, such assessment of risk makes the implemen-
tation of market based premiums possible; on the other hand,
it could contain the risk shifting incentive of banks in case
only actuarially fair insurance premiums can be imple-
mented by the insurers.
Further, we have argued that the tendency to carry ex-
cessive systematic risk by banks could be effectively checked
in cases where banks incorporate the signal from subordi-
nate debt spreads into their risk allocation. This is possible
as optimal quantity of subordinate debt varies directly with
the volatility of spreads, which further varies directly with
the proportion of systematic risk chosen by the banks to al-
locate risky assets.
There are deﬁnite empirically testable implications for the
subordinate debt proposal through market monitoring. Future
research can identify if security markets could assess riski-
ness of the asset portfolios of opaque ﬁrms or ﬁrms with non-
marketable assets. Further, it can be tested whether ﬁrms
respond to market assessment. Finally, for heavily regu-
lated ﬁrms we can check if market signals act as a comple-
ment to their regulators.
Subordinate debt proposal in this paper closely reﬂects the
idea of capital adequacy in contemporary regulations such
as Basel 3. Tier 2 capital in Basel 3 is sought to have securi-
ties subordinated in claims. However, Basel 3 puts up re-
strictions on the maturity of such securities. The proposal in
our paper reinforces the idea of capital adequacy in two im-
portant aspects. First, the market oriented subordinate debt
is more likely to be equity-like rather than debt-like secu-
rity. Thus, it would have more loss absorption capacity than
tier 2 capital envisaged in Basel 3. Second, through continu-
ous market monitoring the spreads in these securities would
complement the efforts of a regulator which can enforce
capital adequacy through several of the means discussed in
an earlier section (titled “Continuous incorporation of sub-
ordinate debt signals by the bank”).
Conclusion
The paper has analysed the risk shifting incentive of a bank
provided with deposit insurance and subordinate debt. While
there are individual shortcomings in these instruments, their
joint featuring to stabilise banks is deemed complementary
in this paper. While deposit insurance can increase welfare
for uninformed depositors and helps in averting information
based bank runs, active monitoring by subordinate debt can
counter moral hazard associated with deposit insurance. The
model developed here explores conditions which can lead
banks to choose the risk consistent with the risk chosen by a
social planner as ﬁrst best.
The model builds on the previous studies, where subor-
dinate debt could not dynamically inﬂuence banks by being
largely passive after entering into a contract. The model here
envisages an active market for subordinate debt which can
continuously impart signals to the regulators and other at-
risk stakeholders. This provides the necessary discipline for
banks so that they may conform to solvency consistent
behaviour. Such active monitoring leads to better alloca-
tion of risk by a bank and provides endogenous incentives to
do so.
While active monitoring is a precondition to achieve the
ﬁrst best, it can be ensured by inducing keener interest on
part of subordinate debt holders to monitor bank risk. A
market in these securities, therefore, is deemed vital which
further enables the incorporation of the risk assessment by
subordinate debt into the objective functions of banks.
The model also depicts the relevance of subordinate debt
in eliminating the distortions in deposit insurance pricing. Spe-
ciﬁcally, subordinate debt helps in checking the risk shift-
ing incentives even when the insurer charges a premium other
than the ﬁrst best, while completely eliminating these in-
centives where optimal quantities of subordinate debt are28 Which is vital requirement to avert information based bank runs.
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chosen. Importantly, the paper also argues that active moni-
toring by subordinate debt can induce incentives for counter-
cyclical asset allocation by banks for their risky portfolios.
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